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8Ethics in the Economy 
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER*
Ethik in der Ökonomie 
Economic sociologists lack coherent theories concerning how ethical disputes arise within economic life, 
and what effects their management has on organizational performance. Using formal codes of ethics 
within firms as its disciplined focus, we can develop a preliminary conceptualization of ethics in or-
ganizations, a series of hypotheses about how codes work, and a preliminary sketch of a reesearch 
program that follows from these principles. 
Keywords: Ethics, Codes, Enforcement, Organizational Performance 
1. Introduction 
In 2003, an ailing Boeing corporation brought back from retirement former president 
Harry Stonecipher to turn the company around. Amid a flurry of reforms, the now 
CEO Stonecipher installed a code of company ethics to publicize the firm’s new self-
discipline. Only two years later, however, he fell afoul of his own reforms. One provi-
sion of the new ethics code stipulated that “employees will not engage in conduct or 
activity that may raise questions as to the company’s honesty, impartiality, or reputa-
tion or otherwise cause embarrassment to the company” (5).1
As newspapers around the US reported, Stonecipher did embarrass Boeing. He carried 
on an affair with a divorced female executive. After an anonymous informant within 
the company disclosed evidence of the relationship, including some steamy emails, to 
the heads of the company’s legal and ethical departments, Boeing’s board of directors 
decided that the 68-year old Stonecipher, long married and with grown children, had 
to go. Stonecipher had violated the very code of ethics the company had put in place 
on his arrival in office. As he said later: “We set – hell, I set – a higher standard here. I 
violated my own standards. I used poor judgment”.2 The collapse of Enron and other 
21st-century business scandals have kept violations of ethical codes in headlines.  
Ethics and economic activity seem to be uneasy companions. If economic activity 
centers on the maximization of efficiency in production, consumption, distribution, 
________________________ 
*  Viviana A. Zelizer is Lloyd Cotsen '50 Professor of Sociology at Princeton University 120 Walla-
ce Hall, Princeton University Princeton, N. J. 08544, phone: +1-(0)609-258-4557, fax: +1(0)-609-
258-2180, email: vzelizer@princeton.edu, fields of expertise: economic sociology, historical ana-
lysis, interpersonal relations, childhood. 
1  http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ethics/ethics_booklet.pdf. Viewed July 19, 
2006.
2  http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/members/issue.tmpl?articleid=03140519022148. Viewed 
July 18, 2006. 
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and transfers of assets, what place can it allow for ethical concerns? Institutional eco-
nomics offers a useful reply: among the institutions that stabilize economies, lower 
transaction costs, and assure commitments, formally enacted rules of good behavior 
play a significant part. 
This paper pursues that insight by identifying a series of intersections between ethics 
and economic activity. Despite the frequency with which CEOs speak of ethics and 
business schools teach courses on the subject, researchers have so far produced no 
more than scattered findings on how ethical questions actually arise within economic 
life, how economic actors respond to them, and what effects those responses have on 
economic performances. The paper therefore concentrates on identifying salient re-
search questions and then closes with concrete suggestions concerning the sort of 
inquiries that would produce better answers than are now available. 
What do we mean by ethical questions? The Oxford English Dictionary defines ethics 
as “the science of morals: the department of study concerned with the principles of 
human duty”. In economic activity then ethics concerns the proper way of conducting 
production, consumption, distribution, and transfer of assets. For instance, ethical 
questions turn out in such varied forms as: is it right to pay women for their eggs? Is it 
wrong for a supervisor to make sexual advances to an employee? May a CEO legiti-
mately issue public reports exaggerating a firm’s economic performance? Is it appro-
priate for company executives to use company jets for personal trips? More generally, 
is it feasible to set rules that eliminate conflicts of interest between a person’s corpo-
rate responsibility and private interests? May a lawyer appropriately use confidential 
information from a client to make profitable investments? May a psychiatrist who 
learns about a patient’s embezzlement on the job appropriately withhold that informa-
tion from an employer or the police?  
These are everyday questions in economic life. Within business circles people have 
had a field day with issues of ethics. In his introduction to a 2006/2007 annual collec-
tion on business ethics, John E. Richardson declares: 
“Recent events have brought ethics to the forefront as a topic of discussion 
throughout our nation. And, undoubtedly, the area of society that is getting the 
closest scrutiny regarding its ethical practices is the business sector. As corporate 
America struggles to find its ethical identity in a business environment that 
grows increasingly complex, managers are confronted with some poignant ques-
tions that have definite ethical ramifications. Does a company have any obliga-
tion to help solve social problems such as poverty, pollution, and urban decay? 
What ethical responsibilities should a multinational corporation assume in for-
eign countries? What obligation does a manufacturer have to the consumer with 
respect to product defects and safety?” (Richardson 2007: iv) 
Economic ethics have also preoccupied moral philosophers and feminist thinkers (e.g. 
Anderson 1993; Buchanan 1985; Gilligan 1982; Held 2005; Larson/Freeman 1997; 
Tronto 1993). Even some economists and economic sociologists have joined the dis-
cussion of morality and economic behavior (e.g. Frank 2003, Hausman/McPherson 
1993; McCloskey 2006; Sen 1987; Swedberg 2005). Questions of moral and immoral 
action arise recurrently in some branches of economic sociology, for example, the 
study of professions, of crime, of inheritance, of consumption, the economics of care, 
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and the commodification of human goods, such as organs, blood, and eggs. A flour-
ishing literature documents the “dark side of organizations,” the prevalence of corrup-
tion and the recurrent temptation to subvert organizational ends in pursuit of paro-
chial interests (e.g. Ashforth/Anand 2003; Baker/Faulkner 2004; Palmer/Maher 2006; 
Vaughan 1999).
Confronted with questions of this sort, both economists and economic sociologists 
often return to comforting dichotomies between the separate spheres of proper eco-
nomic activity and proper normative behavior. On one side, a self-contained world of 
hard-nosed rationality; on the other, another self-contained world of sentiment and 
obligation. Mix the two, goes the reasoning, and both of them suffer (Zelizer 2005). 
As a consequence, economic analysts find it easier to ban ethical and normative ques-
tions from their own agendas as work for philosophers, theologians, and advocates.  
Thomas Piper of Harvard Business School, a pioneer in development of ethics 
courses for MBAs, reports that he met considerable resistance from both sides. Quan-
titative economists voiced “real doubts about whether this was just philanthropy and 
foolishness”. Meanwhile ethicists were “troubled when economics was introduced 
into the conversation” (Rosenberg 2006: 49). Economist Julie Nelson explains:
“A particular belief about commerce and its relation to ethics is implicit in many 
contemporary discussions, both academic and popular. This is the belief that 
money, profits, markets, and corporations are parts of an ‘economic machine’. 
This machine operates in an automatic fashion, following inexorable and amoral 
‘laws’. While the machine organizes provisioning for our bodies, it is itself soul-
less and inhuman. Ethical questions, on the other hand, concern the appropriate 
respect and care for other creatures that we – as living, social, and soulful beings 
– should demonstrate. Since machines are incapable of morality, thinking about 
economies as machines puts commerce firmly outside the ethical realm.” (Nel-
son 2006: 1-2) 
Economic analysts’ banning of ethics oddly parallels the tendency of ethical critics to 
deal with unethical behavior by strict prohibition. 
My own first book, in fact, took up closely related issues. Morals and Markets examined 
the transformation of life insurance from a stigmatized violation of ethical principles 
into a prudent and morally laudable economic investment in the future. In its early 
phases, critics of life insurance decried its insertion of crass commercialism and nar-
row self-interest into a zone of sacred commitments. They questioned: “Has a man 
the right to make the continuance of his life the basis of a bargain? Is it not turning a 
very solemn thing into a mere commercial transaction?” (Our Mutual Friend 1867 as 
cited in Zelizer 1979: 45-46) Insurance agents, in this view, were selling an unethical 
product and thereby undermining public morality. Only by invoking an alternative 
morality did advocates of life insurance succeed in making it first acceptable, and then 
even ethically desirable.  
The early response to life insurance brings out a recurrent feature of ethical disputes at 
large. Critics of unethical behavior do not merely seek to stigmatize it or to make it 
less attractive. They regularly propose to ban specific elements: render them illegal, 
make them conditions for expulsion from an organization and organize attacks on 
perpetrators. Any economic sociologist who studies environmental pollution, auto-
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mobile safety, or other presumed threats to human wellbeing regularly encounters 
calls for outright bans on this menace or that. 
Economics and economic sociology, however, have no coherent body of description 
and explanation concerning ethical principles and their application. As Paul DiMaggio 
remarked when I told him my intention to write this paper: “yes, economic ethics is all 
about eliminating personal influence from organizations, while economic sociology is 
all about finding personal influence in organizations”. Max Weber lost to Schumpeter 
and Hayek. On the whole, views of the economy as an autonomous, distinctive sphere 
of human activity organized around rationality and efficiency have impeded the seri-
ous consideration of morality’s place in economic life.  
This preliminary survey does not take up every question of morality that comes up in 
economic activity. Instead, it closes in on one crucial junction between morality and 
economic life: the formation and operation of formal ethical codes within different 
sorts of economic activity. The paper identifies a series of questions about ethical 
codes that deserve serious theoretical and empirical attention from economic sociolo-
gists and illustrates the interest of those questions by referring to a variety of existing 
empirical analyses. By “formal ethical codes” I mean a codified set of rules for moral 
behavior applying to a specific population. In codes, according to Charles Tilly, “rea-
sons given for actions cite their conformity to specialized sets of categories, proce-
dures for ordering evidence, and rules of interpretation. Together, categories, proce-
dures, and rules make up codes” (Tilly 2006: 102). They include ethical codes labeled 
as such but also implementation in the form of grievance procedures and do-don’t 
statements of principle.  
One further narrowing of our subject matters. Here we concentrate on codes adopted 
by economic organizations, including professional organizations such as medical so-
cieties. That narrowing ignores powerful codes enacted by legislatures and govern-
mental agencies, not to mention codes promulgated by religious bodies, advocacy 
groups, and clusters of intellectuals. Such codes, as we will see, sometimes put pres-
sure on economic organizations. To treat them all in detail here, however, would hin-
der the work of systematizing the place of ethics in economic activity. 
Ethical codes in economic organizations, then, apply categories, procedures, and rules 
to some specific group of actors. For example, corporate codes of ethics typically 
identify categories of contested behavior and of persons at risk to those behaviors, 
procedures for identifying and handling violations, and rules for implementing these 
principles within the corporation. Stonecipher suffered the penalties prescribed by just 
such a code. Five questions call for attention: 
(1) What are the distinctive properties of ethical codes? 
(2) How do they arise? 
(3) How do they produce their effects? 
(4) What produces violations? 
(5) How do codes and responses affect economic activity? 
These are both empirical and analytical questions. The paper takes up each in turn. 
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2. Distinctive Properties of Codes 
An impressive proportion of economic organizations adopt formal ethical codes. In 
their survey of 1,000 major US corporations, Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Treviño, 
and Philip L. Cochran found that 98 percent claimed to address ethical issues in some 
formal document, 78 percent explicitly cited codes of ethics, 51 percent had telephone 
lines for reporting ethical concerns, and 30 percent had offices for dealing with ethics 
and legal compliance. Nearly two-thirds of these offices were created in the 1990s 
(Weaver/Treviño/Cochran 1999). Indeed, in a 2005 Business Ethics article, James C. 
Hyatt, a freelance business writer notes:  
“A lot of companies are singing the compliance blues these days, as they strug-
gle to cope with the complexities of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, passed in 2002 
in the wake of financial scandals (. . .). Corporations are rushing to learn ethics 
virtually overnight, and as they do so, a vast new industry of consultants and 
suppliers has emerged. The ethics industry has been born.” (Hyatt 2005) 
Hyatt cites the rush to ethics by Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and The New York Times 
Co. among many others. In fact, world standards are already emerging for corporate 
ethical codes. A Harvard Business School research team has created a so-called Global 
Business Standards Codex synthesizing the ethical principles and rules that recur in 
the most prestigious and influential codes (Paine et al. 2005). From those codes the 
team distills eight recurrent principles: fiduciary, property, reliability, transparency, 
dignity, fairness, citizenship, and responsiveness. Looked at more closely, the codes 
involved synthesize Tilly’s categories, procedures, and rules. Codes are in vogue. 
Codes may conform to general moral principles such as “do no harm”. But, they often 
go beyond general principles by specifying (a) categories of persons, activities, and 
sites of activity to which they apply, (b) procedures for identifying instances of those 
categories, and (c) rules distinguishing between required and banned activities in those 
circumstances. They sometimes also specify (d) penalties for banned activities. Ethical 
codes governing sexual behavior within a corporation, for example, typically state to 
whom, what, and where they apply (do offsite liaisons matter?), who should report a 
violation and how (does every employee who learns of an illicit affair have an obliga-
tion to report it, and if so to whom?), exactly what counts as a violation (does recur-
rent flirting without further sexual relations transgress the code?), and what penalties 
transgressors should receive (does a violation lead to automatic firing?). 
In addition to sexual behavior, ethical codes often govern other forms of intimacy. 
FedEx’s extensive “Code of Business Conduct & Ethics” of 2003, for example, illus-
trates its principles with this Q & A:
“Question: I believe that I did not receive a promotion because my manager 
knows that I am attempting to become pregnant. I heard my manager say that 
when a woman becomes pregnant, it inevitably interferes with job performance. 
Is there anything I can do? 
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Answer: Yes. All employment-related decisions at FedEx (e.g. promotion, re-
muneration, training, etc.) must be based on job-related criteria, skills, and per-
formance. You should use the complaint processes within your operating com-
pany or report the situation to our human resources representative or to your 
company’s legal department. A report could also be made using the FedEx Alert 
Line.” (4)3
As compared with the rules of thumb and matters of degree that most people adopt 
when facing everyday moral questions, codes describe sharp boundaries between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable behavior. In its 1989 company handbook, the giant retailer 
Wal-Mart, for example, forbade married employees (whether separated or not) from 
dating other employees of the firm. When a romantic couple fell under the ban and 
lost their Wal-Mart jobs, they sued. In a 1995 landmark case a New York court upheld 
the company’s ban.4 Later, however, Wal-Mart dropped that provision, restricting its 
prohibition to relationships between supervisors and employees (Sugarman 2003). The 
pertinent section of its 2005 “Statement of Ethics” reads:  
“You may not date or become romantically involved with another Associate if 
you can influence that Associate’s terms and conditions of employment or if 
that Associate can influence the terms and conditions of your employment.” 
(16)5
Such regulations do not necessarily work well outside the US. In 2005, for example, 
workers’ representatives from Wal-Mart’s 91 German stores successfully blocked in 
court the installation of a ban on inter-office dating.6
In 1998, Business Week reported a remarkable variant on codes governing office ro-
mance: the so-called “cupid contract”. “A few months back,” reported the magazine:  
“Garry G. Mathiason, senior partner with Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & 
Mathiason, the nation’s largest employment law firm, got a call from a very 
sheepish general counsel for a major company. The president of the company, 
the counsel said, ‘is planning to have a consensual affair with one of his employ-
ees,’ but before he does, ‘he wants to draft a written agreement’ stating that the 
affair is voluntary – to reduce the chance that the woman might file a sexual-
harassment suit if they broke up. ‘You won’t believe it’, Mathiason assured the 
nervous counsel. ‘But we’ve already drafted a standard form’ for just such 
cases.” (Symonds et al. 1998) 
Legal scholar Vicki Schultz (2003) identifies such regulations as attempts to create a 
“sanitized workplace”. According to Schultz, codes and compacts of this sort not only 
stifle creative collaboration within economic organizations, but even more danger-
________________________ 
3  http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/downloads/code.pdf. Viewed July 18, 2006. 
4  State v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc. 621 N.Y.S. 2d. 158 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. Jan 05, 1995).  
5  http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/11/112761/corpgov/Ethics%20_Current.pdf. 
Viewed July 18, 2006. 
6  http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2005/050617/economy1.html. 
Viewed July 18, 2006. That court action was only one sign of Wal-Mart’s incompatibility with 
German corporate culture. In 2006, the big firm pulled out of Germany. 
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ously, they also distract the same organizations from more profound sources of gen-
der inequality. Whether or not they produce such deleterious effects, codes regularly 
mark sharp boundaries which employees’ behavior must not transgress.  
Ethical codes, furthermore, often attach penalties for infractions that bear little rela-
tionship to the economic organization’s loss from the infraction. The Johnson & 
Johnson corporation pioneered ethical codes as early as the 1940s. Researcher Michael 
Lindsay reports an interview with former Johnson & Johnson CEO Ralph Larsen, 
who made a striking comparison. As a young executive in the early 1960s, Larsen had 
made an egregious ordering error that cost the company $25,000, a very large sum for 
the time. The executive recalls his fear that his mistake would cost him his job. 
Instead, Larsen recalls: “My boss called me in, and he said, you learn anything? He 
asked me what happened. And I say, yeah. He said, get out of here. That was the end 
of it”. About the same time, another Johnson & Johnson employee who walked out of 
the plant with two bottles of baby shampoo lost his job immediately: “Never saw him 
again. He was fired immediately. These were things, you know coming off the line in 
the thousands” (Lindsay 2006). The ethical boundary was sharp and the penalty im-
mediate.
3. How Do Ethical Codes Arise? 
Three rather different circumstances promote the formation of ethical codes: external 
pressure, emulation, and internal crisis. First, external authorities sometimes insist on 
enacting internal codes as they enforce conformity to tax codes, professional stan-
dards, or licensing of specialized services. Second, prestigious organizations provide 
models of internal regulation that other organizations adopt readily as ways of demon-
strating their own effectiveness and/or membership in an elite circle. Third, internal 
crises often generate new rules, and sometimes whole codes – especially if the crisis 
produces a moral debate within the organization or a scandal that tarnishes the or-
ganization’s public reputation (March et al. 2000). Family businesses appear to be 
somewhat less vulnerable to such pressures; at least they less frequently install formal 
codes of ethics (Adams et al. 1996). 
Crises have been generating codes for a long time. Paul Starr points out that the rela-
tively weak 19th century American Medical Association adopted its code of ethics in 
response to a deep crisis: loss of protection against standard medicine’s rivals when a 
competition-loving New York State repealed its licensing statutes in 1844. In this 
crisis, according to Starr: 
“The orthodox profession could no longer look to the state for protection 
against what it viewed as the degradation of its standards. This was the impetus 
for the AMA’s adoption of a code of professional ethics, with its concern for 
excluding sectarian and untrained practitioners.” (Starr 1982: 91) 
Among other things, the new code barred patient stealing, free advice to affluent 
friends, and public airing of disagreements concerning the proper treatment of a given 
patient (Starr 1982: 94; Rothman 2002: 110). In short, the crisis caused orthodox phy-
sicians to close ranks in defense of a threatened monopoly.  
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Ethical codes have a long history in American business and professions (Abbott 
1983). As early as the 1920s, Edgar L. Heermance published a compilation of codes of 
ethics and the American Academy of Political and Social Science produced a special 
issue on the subject (Heermance 1924; “The Ethics” 1922). When external pressures 
or internal crises built up, firms regularly defended themselves by enacting codes. 
After the Watergate and the securities and exchange commission scandals of the 
1970s, for example, many American corporations installed top-down ethical codes in 
which chief executives instructed their underlings on behavior that would avoid cor-
porate disgrace. In an analysis of 119 conduct codes promulgated during the period, 
Donald Cressey and Charles Moore identified two spurs to production of new codes: 
defensive responses to the scandals themselves, and direct SEC pressure to eliminate 
false books as a device for concealing corporate misconduct (Cressey/Moore 1983: 
56-7).
Top executives were not alone, however, in promoting ethical codes. In a comprehen-
sive analysis of sexual harassment grievance procedures and anti-harassment training 
from 1977 to 1997, Frank Dobbin and Erin Kelly (2007) show that personnel manag-
ers pushed the adoption of such practices over considerable resistance from company 
lawyers and substantial doubt that the practices reduced legal liability. The personnel 
experts – now relabeled Human Resources Management specialists – defended their 
turf against lawyers who had been taking over concerns with civil rights, employment 
discrimination, and related matters. In short, external pressures combine with internal 
struggles to generate more extensive and explicit ethical codes.  
4. How Do Ethical Codes Produce Their Effects?  
We must distinguish between two kinds of effects: display effects and enforcement 
effects. Enactment of a code almost always involves an element of display, advertising 
to people inside and outside the organization’s vigilance, uprightness, and/or mem-
bership in an organizational elite. Many a code adopted for display suitably impresses 
the naïve, but leaves knowledgeable insiders smirking.  
Enforcement effects concern direct influence over behavior within the organization. 
Leaving aside perverse effects such as sabotage and simple dissimulation, genuine 
enforcement effects for ethical codes operate through four clusters of causes: 
(1) Most obviously but not necessarily most effectively, rewards for good behavior 
and penalties for bad behavior, if actually delivered, deter banned activities 
through threat, promise, or simple elimination of bad actors from the organiza-
tion. Thus the dramatic firing of a cashier who dips his fingers into the till 
sends a signal to everyone else who handles the organization’s money. 
(2) As analysts of principal-agent relations regularly point out, selection eliminates 
candidates for ethically sensitive positions who lack credentials, previous re-
cords of reliability, or attributes employers associate with propensities for ethi-
cal uprightness. Potential cashiers generally undergo much more extensive 
screening for likely moral responsibility, say, than computer programmers do.  
(3) Socialization also makes a difference. Assimilation into an organization where 
everyone evinces horror – or fright – at the very idea of falsifying accounts re-
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inforces the reluctance of new members to cheat in that way, almost regardless 
of the likelihood of detection and punishment for falsifying accounts. As little 
effect as pious exhortations from CEOs are likely to have, daily teaching from 
fellow workers increases the effectiveness of ethical codes. 
(4) More subtly, ethical behavior becomes part of the mutual expectations of or-
ganization members who are engaged in relations of reciprocity: my not break-
ing the rules increases the chances that in the future I will refrain from under-
cutting you as well as decreasing the likelihood that I will pull you down 
through guilt by association. Thus multiple developers of the same software 
come to owe each other protection of the software’s secrets from outside com-
petitors.  
To be sure, each of the four enforcement effects remains vulnerable to collusion by 
code violators within the organization: joint concealment of violations from sanction-
ing agents, recruitment of confederates, socialization into code-violating subcultures, 
and mutual protection among violators. Yet when organizations’ ethical codes do 
work, they do so through some combination of sanctions, selection, socialization, and 
mutual investment in interpersonal relations.  
Visible sanctions get plenty of attention from corporate managers. In his 2005 best-
seller Winning, famous manager Jack Welch speaks about “a culture of integrity”:  
“In such cultures, there can be no head fakes or winks. People who break the 
rules do not leave the company for ’personal reasons’ or to ’spend more time 
with their families.’ They are hanged—publicly—and the reasons are made pain-
fully clear to everyone.  
Perhaps the lawyers will warn you against saying too much. But if you’ve got the 
facts right, you should be comfortable laying out who broke the rules and how. 
There are enormous organizational benefits from making examples of people 
who have violated your policies.” (Welch 2005: 151) 
Similarly, online giant Google has issued an elaborate code of conduct that includes 
many a thou shalt and thou shalt not, but warns unambiguously that violations will 
receive punishment. In the code’s 2004 version, fair employment practices, ban on 
harassment and discrimination, warnings against drugs, alcohol use, weapons use, and 
violence, exclusion of cats from company premises, controls over conflicts of interest, 
preservation of confidential information, maintaining accurate records, protecting 
company property, and obeying the law all find their way into the Google code. At the 
end, nevertheless, comes the sting: 
“If you know of a situation or incident that you feel may violate this Code, 
please report it to your manager or to Human Resources. Your report will be 
reviewed and any Googler found to have violated any of the terms of this code 
will be subject to disciplinary action that may include termination of employ-
ment. We’ll also take any appropriate steps to prevent any further violations.” 
(11)7
________________________ 
7 http://investor.google.com/conduct.html. Viewed July 18, 2006. 
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In code after code, the bottom line ends with dismissal. But curtailment of privileges, 
demotion, or even turnover for outside prosecution may also occur to wayward em-
ployees. 
What happens, however, when malfeasance occurs at an organization’s top? At times, 
whistle blowers or conscientious professionals illustrate the combined effects of so-
cialization and mutual investment. Robert Jackall identifies a fascinating variation on 
this theme: a British-trained chartered public accountant in a large American firm who 
discovered that the company’s top officers were bribing officials of foreign countries 
and fudging internal accounts including pension funds to their own financial advan-
tage. After he had complained, Brady, the accountant, returned from a hospital stay to 
discover that the company had demoted and transferred him. Brady reported the 
problem to an influential friend within the corporation, who took the affair to the 
chair of the corporate board’s audit committee. The company immediately fired the 
friend and escorted him from the building with armed guards (Jackall 1988: 108). 
Clearly enforcement effects only work within limits set by the current structure of 
corporate power (see Morrill et al. 1997).
5. What Produces Violations of Ethical Codes?  
Even well articulated ethical codes suffer violations. Failure of the main code-
enforcing causes – sanctions, selection, socialization, and mutual investment in inter-
personal relations – makes violations possible, but does not cause them directly. 
What does? Broadly speaking, we can distinguish among (a) individual advantage, (b) 
interpersonal loyalty, and (c) unauthorized collective enterprises. In the presence of an 
ethical code, almost every organizational member has incentives to cheat at least now 
and then, if only to save effort. Those incentives become substantial when the mem-
ber’s organizational position puts resources or information at the member’s disposi-
tion that, if used in violation of the code, would bring significant rewards outside the 
organization. But even in the absence of material rewards, abuse of job-related perqui-
sites sometimes becomes the means of acquiring prestige, wielding influence, or re-
ceiving sexual favors.  
Interpersonal loyalty figures in violations of ethical codes when the code requires re-
porting of unethical behavior, but mutual commitments within pairs or small clusters 
of co-workers inhibit that very reporting, because the likely damage to the violator 
would break bonds of loyalty. Whistle-blowers regularly face charges of disloyalty and 
self-aggrandizement.
Within economic organizations, workers often create unauthorized collective enter-
prises: organized factions and patron-client chains, systems of collaboration and job-
trading, betting pools, gossip circuits, and more. Many of them do the organization no 
harm, and some even serve the organization by enhancing commitment or solving 
production problems (Granovetter 2007). To the extent that such enterprises develop 
their own internal solidarities and raisons d’être, nevertheless, chances increase that 
they will have three kinds of effects on organizational life: generating violations of 
ethical codes in pursuit of the collective enterprise, enabling participants to screen 
their collective activities from organizational monitoring, and inhibiting individual 
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participants from reporting infractions to higher authorities. Powerful organizational 
subcultures form in the shadows.
Michel Anteby uses his detailed observations of a French aerospace factory to illus-
trate the general practice he calls poaching: “the use of company machines or material 
on company time to create artifacts for employees’ personal use” (Anteby 2003: 218). 
In the plant Anteby studied, workers regularly made parts for their own vehicles, bar-
becues, and domestic appliances. Strictly forbidden by the plant codes, these wide-
spread practices depended on extensive collaborative enterprises. Bosses who learned 
about them, furthermore, often had little choice but to tolerate their subordinates’ 
departure from the rules. In fact, as Anteby documents in detail, such unauthorized 
collective enterprises recur in a wide range of manufacturing. Those workers who 
actually receive punishment for this sort of violation typically have operated outside 
the conspiracy, or have somehow fallen out with its participants. 
Managers themselves sometimes collude in their subordinates’ evasion of well-defined 
ethical codes. Prohibitions on the exchange of gifts with outside contractors and offi-
cials typically raise dilemmas for sales personnel, so much so that corporate codes 
often exclude occasional exchanges of meals, entertainment, and symbolic objects 
from ban on gifts. Toys “R” Us’ 2003 ethics code, for example, declares:
“The Company generally prohibits the acceptance from suppliers or customers 
of the Company of any gifts or gratuities, whether in the form of money, mer-
chandise, services, meals, entertainment, travel or any other form. If permitted 
by applicable law, a gift may be accepted by an associate from a supplier or a 
customer if the gift is (i) a perishable item (for example, food) that has little or 
no resale value, (ii) any other non-cash gift valued at less than $50 provided the 
gifts are not received on a regular or frequent basis, (iii) a meal or entertainment 
that is permitted by this paragraph, or (iv) approved by an Ombudsperson on 
the basis that acceptance of the particular gift serves a legitimate, business-
related purpose.” (5)8
Calvin Morrill tells the tale of a major toy company dealing with suppliers in Southeast 
Asia. During a business trip, two prominent company officials accepted the supplier’s 
gifts – Rolex watches for themselves, jade jewelry for their wives – on the belief that 
the gifts reinforced their company’s ties to the supplier. The senior vice president to 
whom they reported objected vigorously to this violation of the company code, order-
ing the officials to return the gifts.  
Nevertheless, the vice president recognized the dilemma. He and the officials made 
the following arrangement: the vice president himself would travel to Asia for clarify-
ing talks with the suppliers and until then the two men would accept no further gifts. 
Nor did anyone report the violation to the company’s ethics committee (Morrill 1995: 
199). Thus, every code allows for nuances, exceptions, and minor subversions.
________________________ 
8  http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/12/120622/Corp%20Gov/Code_of_Ethics_ 
031504.pdf. Viewed July 19, 2006.  
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6. How Do Codes and Responses to Them Affect Economic Activity?  
Even more so than in the case of the earlier questions, any prudent answer to this 
question runs like this: let us do a lot more systematic research, and then decide. So 
far, we have no systematic body of research and theory that allows us to pinpoint 
effects of organizations’ ethical codes and organization members’ responses to them. 
The closest we come is the recently superabundant discussion of corporate social 
responsibility (see e.g. Bartley 2005). But even there a comprehensive survey published 
in 2003 concludes that the widespread consensus on the positive effects of responsi-
bility initiatives may result from an illusion (Margolis/Walsh 2003). Back to the draw-
ing board! Throwing prudence to the winds, however, we can at least draw out the 
implications of my earlier arguments. If ethical codes, for example, substitute sharp 
yes-no boundaries for continua from unacceptable to meritorious behavior, we should 
expect two complementary effects to occur: concentration of organizational efforts at 
monitoring, control, and conformity itself precisely along that boundary, and dis-
placement of dubious behavior into gray areas left gray by that concentration on the 
boundary. Thus we should find money-handlers punctilious about the transactions 
singled out by the code, but ready to compromise or obfuscate when it comes to other 
transactions.  
The sources of ethical codes should also make a difference. External pressure should, 
in principle, produce quasi-conspiracies in which an organization’s members (or at 
least its chief monitors) create collective performances that will satisfy external agen-
cies without necessarily rectifying abuses in the areas under scrutiny. Emulation of 
prestigious organizations should produce an even greater fixation on labels and pro-
cedures, and even less internal monitoring of the code’s effects. Internal crisis, in con-
trast, most likely produces more extensive efforts to construct explanations of what 
went wrong, greater elaborations of prohibitions and penalties based on those expla-
nations (however valid), broader internal monitoring, and serious impacts on em-
ployee behavior.  
As for how codes produce their effects, the distinction between display effects and 
enforcement effects again clarifies the question. To the extent that displays respond to 
pressure from powerful external agencies, we can expect them to shift the organiza-
tion’s visible performances in the directions demanded by those agencies. To the ex-
tent that the displays serve the purposes of advertising, executive self-esteem, or or-
ganizational self-image, however, we should expect relatively superficial effects on 
actual organizational performance as represented either by interactions among internal 
segments or by aggregate output in the form of efficiency, productivity, profitability, 
or quality of goods and services produced. 
When it comes to enforcement effects, we enter a likely zone of fascinating but con-
troversial results. Do clearly announced rewards and punishments for coded behavior, 
selection, deliberate socialization, or the integration of codes into interpersonal rela-
tions affect overall performance differently? For future investigation, I suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
(1) The four sorts of enforcement effects fall into an ascending order of cost to 
managers, with selection generally easier to perform, new rewards and penalties 
20
relatively cheap to put into place (at least initially), interpersonal relations costly 
to penetrate, and socialization in between. 
(2) The extent of organizational transformation that results from the four en-
forcement effects falls in precisely the opposite order, with penetration of in-
terpersonal relations far more transformative than socialization, selection, and, 
especially, generally applied rewards and punishments. 
(3) Nevertheless, as before, the institution of ethical codes generally concentrates 
attention along the boundaries identified explicitly in the codes, and shifts du-
bious behavior toward unspecified gray areas. 
(4) Codes always become instruments of internal power struggles, and therefore 
vary greatly in their overall effects depending on internal structures of, and 
struggles over, power.  
These risky hypotheses follow more or less directly from my earlier arguments. That 
is, of course, no guarantee that they are correct. They call out for systematic research.  
I also proposed earlier that violations of codes spring from three sources: individual 
advantage, interpersonal loyalty, and unauthorized collective enterprises. If so, we 
should discover distinctly different effects of ethical codes depending on which of the 
three prevails. We could reasonably expect codes entailing specific rewards and pun-
ishments for specific forms of behavior to shift individual advantage visibly and rap-
idly. Interpersonal loyalty is likely to resist the application of codes more tenaciously, 
but to be vulnerable to public disclosure. 
Unauthorized collective enterprises offer the most interesting challenge both to codes 
and to analysts. Surely we would first have to know how much workers have invested 
in the enterprise: a betting pool disappears more easily than an internal system of job 
collaboration. But in general we should suppose that unauthorized collective enter-
prises lend their participants the capacity to preserve the enterprise while altering visi-
ble signs and behaviors enough to simulate conformity with publicly announced ethi-
cal codes. 
7. Economic Sociology and Ethics: Future Agenda 
For the purposes of this paper, I have narrowed the scope of ethics radically. Codes 
are crucial but they do not exhaust the topic. Three agendas follow: first, we need to 
examine the relationship between general ethical contexts and the specific forms of 
code that organizations adopt. We might reasonably expect, for example, that national 
ethical traditions shape contrasting approaches to both the construction and the con-
tents of formal ethical codes (see e.g. Langlois/Schlegelmilch 1990).  
Second, we can appropriately ask how differently more general ethical principles such 
as ‘do no harm’, ‘render good for good’, and ‘act fairly’ operate as compared with the 
boundary defining codes we have reviewed here. It could well be, for example, that 
general principles of this kind have stronger effects on organizational behavior than 
explicit codes to the extent that the principles involved belong to the cultural context 
and cover a wider range of behavior than economic activity within organizations.  
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Beyond these two relatively manageable agendas for economic sociology, looms a 
much larger set of questions that many economic sociologists might prefer to avoid. 
Critics of capitalism often complain that the system itself incorporates unethical prin-
ciples, such as exploitation, profit-maximization, and neglect of the vulnerable. Advo-
cates of what the French call “économie solidaire” and “commerce équitable” for 
example, do not merely propose building greater solidarity into existing economic 
relations but claim that such arrangements as microcredits, cooperatives, and alterna-
tive currencies (“monnaies sociales”) implement superior ethical principles (see e.g. 
Blanc 2006; Le Velly 2006; Mertz 2005; Servet/Guérin 2002). 
Similarly, advocates of corporate responsibility, social democracy, welfare capitalism, 
and radical environmentalism claim superiority for their own ethical principles. 
Whether or not economic sociologists subscribe to such programs, they ought to con-
sider whether capitalism and its alternatives spring from competing ethical principles, 
and if so, how. 
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